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Summary: As the world’s second largest carbon emitter, China has long been criticised as a “free-rider” 
enjoying benefits from other countries’ efforts to abate greenhouse gas emissions but not taking due 
responsibilities of its own. China has been singled out as one of the major targets at the subsequent 
negotiations after the Kyoto curtain had fallen. By analyzing the historical contributions of inter-fuel 
switching, energy conservation, economic growth and population expansion to China’s CO2 emissions 
during the period 1980-1997, this article first demonstrates that the above criticism cannot hold its ground. 
Then the article envisions some efforts and commitments that could be expected from China until its per capita 
income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries. By emphasizing the win-win strategies, 
these efforts and commitments could be unlikely to severely jeopardize China’s economic development and, 
at the same time, would give the country more leverage at the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In December 1997, 160 countries reached an historical agreement on limiting greenhouse gas emissions in 
Kyoto. While the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Earth 
Summit in June 1992 committed Annex I countries to “aim” to stabilize emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and other greenhouse gases at their 1990 levels by 2000, the so-called Kyoto Protocol goes further. It sets 
legally binding emissions targets and timetables for these countries. Together, Annex I countries must reduce 
their emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels over the commitment period 2008-
2012, with the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and  Japan required to reduce their emissions of 
such gases by 8%, 7% and 6% respectively (UNFCCC, 1997). The Protocol will become effective once it is 
ratified by at least 55 parties whose CO2 emissions represent at least 55% of the total from Annex I Parties in 
the year 1990. 
 
The binding emissions targets set at Kyoto for Annex I countries, although far short of what developing 
countries called for, may give them some “moral” right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful 
mitigation action. There is no doubt that securing meaningful participation from key developing countries will 
remain a priority for the US.1 From the industrialized countries’ perspective, the lack of developing countries’ 
                                                          
1 In the run up to Kyoto, the US Senate voted 95 to 0 in July 1997 for a resolution warning President Clinton 
not to sign a treaty that puts emissions limits on the United States but no requirements at all on developing 
countries. Since any treaty would have to go the Senate for ratification, the Clinton administration has adopted 
the Senate’s position by calling for “meaningful participation” from developing countries and has made it 
clear that the Kyoto Protocol will not be submitted to the Senate until key developing countries are included. 
involvement in combating climate change aggravates their short-term concerns about international 
competitiveness. Non-participation of developing countries also increases emissions leakage that could arise in 
the short term, as emissions controls lower world fossil fuel prices, and in the long term, as industries relocate 
to developing countries to avoid emissions controls at home. In addition, it raises the spectre of developing 
countries becoming “locked in” to more fossil fuel intensive economy and eliminates the Annex I countries’ 
opportunity to obtain low-cost abatement options. When there is no emissions trading at all, the cost of 
complying with the Kyoto target for the US would run to $125 per ton of carbon, according to Dr. Janet 
Yellen (1998), Chair of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers, testifying on 4 March 1998 before 
the House Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power about the domestic economic implications of the 
Kyoto Protocol. With emissions trading only among Annex I countries, the cost would drop to $30-50 per ton. 
With fully worldwide emissions trading, the cost would further drop to $14-23 per ton. This clearly explains 
why the US puts heavy emphasis on the involvement of developing countries. Indeed, recent Indonesian bush 
fires choking Southeast Asia served as a graphic reminder that developing countries have an important part to 
play in protecting the environment against global warming. 
 
On the other hand, developing countries insist that the US demand contradicts an earlier United Nations 
agreement, known as the Berlin Mandate, which attempts to set binding targets and timetables only to 
industrialized countries. They argue that industrialized countries are responsible for the majority of both 
historical and current greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, must demonstrate once and for all that they are 
really taking the lead in reducing their emissions. Developing countries insist that they have very little 
historical responsibility for climate problems, although industrialized countries insist that developing countries 
represent rapidly growing emissions sources in line with their industrialization and urbanization. 
 
China is the world’s most populous country and largest coal producer and consumer. At present, it 
contributes 13.5% of global CO2 emissions, which makes it the world’s second largest emitter of CO2, after 
the US, according to the World Energy Council (see Table 1). China’s share in global CO2 emissions is 
expected to increase and is likely to exceed that of the US by 2020, if the current trend of economic 
development in China continues (World Bank, 1994). That is why China has been singled out as one of the 
major targets at the subsequent negotiations after the Kyoto curtain had fallen. Indeed, both before and at 
Kyoto, China was already the attacked target. Media, particularly those from the West, had painted a much 
distorted picture of China by simply repeating the statement of its chief negotiator that Beijing would reject 
“the introduction of any new commitments for developing countries” as well as the “launching of any 
negotiating process” for such a purpose. In addition, the media explicitly overlooked many positive actions 
that had been taken by China. Since the Annex I countries had made commitments at Kyoto, Western media 
now could easily fool the general public by blaming China for not adopting binding commitments and even 
for “blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries’ commitments. This 
underlines the importance of China’s strategies at the subsequent climate negotiations. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Shares of Global CO2 Emissions and World Population, 1996 
 
 Share of global CO2 emissions (%) Share of the world population (%) 
USA 
EU-15 
China 
CIS Republics 
Japan 
India 
Canada 
Australia 
25.0 
14.7 
13.5 
10.2 
5.6 
3.6 
2.1 
1.3 
4.7 
6.5 
21.5 
5.0 
2.2 
16.3 
0.5 
0.3 
 
Source: Jefferson (1997). 
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In this article, we first examine the historical evolution of China’s CO2 emissions during the period 1980-
1997. By analyzing the historical contributions of inter-fuel switching, energy conservation, economic 
growth and population expansion to CO2 emissions, we indicate that China has made significant 
contribution to reducing global CO2 emissions, although none of these carbon savings have resulted from 
domestic climate mitigation policies. Next, we analyze what the economic effects would be if China’s 
carbon emissions in 2010 were cut by 20% and 30%, respectively, relative to the baseline. Then, we envision 
some plausible strategies that China might take at the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are drawn. 
 
 
2. Decoupling China’s Carbon Emissions Increases from Economic Growth from 1980 - 1997 
 
With more than 1.2 billion people, China is home to about 21.5% of the world’s population (see Table 1) 
and has a large and rapidly growing economy, making the country an important player on the world’s 
stage. Since launching its open-door policy and economic reform in late 1978, China has experienced 
spectacular economic growth, with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing at the average annual rate of 
about 10% over the period 1978-1997. Along with the rapid economic development, energy consumption 
rose from 571.4 million tons of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 1978 to 1440.0 Mtce in 1997. Currently, China 
consumes almost 1400 million tons of coal a year, leading the world in both production and consumption 
of coal. As indicated in Figure 1, coal has accounted for about 75% of the total energy consumption over 
the past years. This share has remained stable after having increased from 70% in 1976, indicating that coal 
has fuelled much of China’s economic growth over the past two decades. Although China had surpassed 
Russia to become the world’s second largest energy producer and user in 1993, China’s current per capita 
energy consumption of 1.165 tons of coal equivalent (tce) (see Table 3) is about half the world’s average, 
or only about one-twelfth of that of the US. 
 
Accompanying the growth in fossil fuel use, China’s CO2 emissions have grown rapidly. The 
corresponding CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in China over the period 1980-1997 have been calculated 
based on fossil fuel consumption and by using the CO2 emission coefficients given in Table 2 that are 
measured in tons of carbon per ton of coal equivalent (tC/tce) and are generally considered suitable for 
China. As shown in Table 3, the total CO2 emissions in China rose from 358.60 million tons of carbon 
(MtC) in 1980 to 847.25 MtC in 1997, with an average annual growth rate of 5.2%. This ranks China as 
the world’s second largest CO2 emitter only behind the US. But on a per capita basis, China’s CO2 emissions 
of 0.685 tC in 1997 (see Table 3) were very low, only about half the world average. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Composition of Energy Consumption in China, 1976-1997 
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Sources: Drawn based on data from the State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1998). 
 
Table 2 
CO2 Emission Coefficients for China 
 
Fuels tC/tce 
Coal 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Hydropower, Nuclear power and Renewables 
0.651 
0.543 
0.404 
0 
 
Source: Energy Research Institute (1991). 
 
The breakdown of CO2 emissions by fuel is shown in Figure 2. Because of the coal-dominant structure of 
Chinese energy consumption, it is not surprising that coal predominates, accounting for 81.3% of the total 
emissions in 1997. This share has remained almost unchanged over the past two decades. 
 
Let us now turn to the contributions of inter-fuel switching, energy conservation, economic growth and 
population expansion to CO2 emissions over the past 17 years. 
 
CO2 emissions can be subdivided as follows:2 
                                                          
2 This is a concrete form of the so-called Ehrlich equation I = PAT, where I represents the adverse environ-
mental impact, P is the population, A is the consumption per capita, and T is the amount of resources required 
by environmentally damaging technology for producing one unit of consumption (cf. Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 
1990). It is used as a proxy for a determinant of environmental impact. 
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Figure 2  
China’s CO2 Emissions by Fuel 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1980 1990 1997
C
O
2 
Em
is
si
on
s 
(M
tC
)
Natural gas
Oil
Coal
 
 
where C is the amount of CO2 emissions, FEC is the total carbon-based fossil fuel consumption, TEC is the 
total commercial energy consumption, GDP is the Gross Domestic Product, and POP is the population. 
 
Taking logs and differences over time yields: 
  Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ
log log / log / log
log log
C =  (C FEC) +  (FEC TEC)  +  (TEC / GDP) 
  
 +  (GDP / POP) +  (POP)
 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of the identity shows the effect of changes in the composition of 
carbon-based fossil fuels on emissions, and the second term indicates the contribution of the penetration of 
carbon-free fuels (1-FEC/TEC) to a reduction in emissions (if the share of carbon-free fuels (1-FEC/TEC) 
is increased, the CO2 emissions can be effectively reduced). These two terms therefore capture the 
contribution of inter-fuel substitution to the changes in emissions, as explained below: fuels vary 
considerably in their relative CO2 emissions. Specific CO2 emission from coal burning is 1.6 times that 
from natural gas and 1.2 times that from oil (see Table 2). Hydropower, nuclear energy and renewables do 
not produce CO2 emissions. In this regard, increased use of carbon-free energy sources, along with 
substitution of natural gas for the more pollution-producing coal and oil, would clearly reduce CO2 
emissions.  
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Table 3 
Determining Factors for CO2 Emissions in China 
 
Year POP 
(million) 
C 
(MtC) 
GDPa 
 
TEC 
(Mtce) 
FEC 
(Mtce) 
GDP/POP
(US$)b 
TEC/GDPc FEC/TEC C/FEC 
(tC/tce) 
TEC/POP
(tce) 
C/POP 
(tC) 
C/GDPd
1980 987.05 358.60 3011.87 602.75 578.70 305 2.001 0.960 0.620 0.611 0.363 1.191 
1981 1000.72 352.63 3170.25 594.47 567.66 317 1.875 0.955 0.621 0.594 0.352 1.112 
1982 1016.54 367.82 3455.86 620.67 590.51 340 1.796 0.951 0.623 0.611 0.362 1.064 
1983 1030.08 390.39 3832.34 660.40 625.66 372 1.723 0.947 0.624 0.641 0.379 1.019 
1984 1043.57 421.41 4413.94 709.04 674.23 423 1.606 0.951 0.625 0.679 0.404 0.955 
1985 1058.51 456.58 5008.53 766.82 729.63 473 1.531 0.952 0.626 0.724 0.431 0.912 
1986 1075.07 482.01 5452.52 808.50 770.42 507 1.483 0.953 0.626 0.752 0.448 0.884 
1987 1093.00 517.32 6083.45 866.32 826.12 557 1.424 0.954 0.626 0.793 0.473 0.850 
1988 1110.26 554.98 6768.91 929.97 886.08 610 1.374 0.953 0.626 0.838 0.500 0.820 
1989 1127.04 577.37 7044.13 969.34 921.94 625 1.376 0.951 0.626 0.860 0.512 0.820 
1990 1143.33 586.87 7314.16 987.03 936.40 640 1.349 0.949 0.627 0.863 0.513 0.802 
1991 1158.23 618.90 7986.64 1037.83 988.01 690 1.299 0.952 0.626 0.896 0.534 0.775 
1992 1171.71 650.12 9123.88 1091.70 1038.21 779 1.197 0.951 0.626 0.932 0.555 0.713 
1993 1185.17 687.61 10354.59 1159.93 1099.61 874 1.120 0.948 0.625 0.979 0.580 0.664 
1994 1198.50 724.65 11665.79 1227.37 1157.41 973 1.052 0.943 0.626 1.024 0.605 0.621 
1995 1211.21 771.24 12891.31 1311.76 1231.74 1064 1.018 0.939 0.626 1.083 0.637 0.598 
1996 1223.89 820.71 14127.21 1389.48 1313.06 1154 0.984 0.945 0.625 1.135 0.671 0.581 
1997 1236.26 847.25 15370.91 1440.00 1357.92 1243 0.937 0.943 0.624 1.165 0.685 0.551 
 
a Measured in 100 million US$ at 1980 prices and at the average exchange rate 1 US$ = 1.5 Chinese yuan. 
b At 1980 prices. 
c Measured in tce per thousand US$ at 1980 prices. 
d Measured in tC per thousand US$ at 1980 prices. 
Sources: Calculated based on data from the State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1998). 
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Figure 3 
Contribution to CO2 Emissions in China, 1980-1997 
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The third term shows the effect of changes in the aggregate energy intensity on emissions, and the last two 
terms show the effect on emissions due to growth in income per capita and population respectively. 
Needless to say, this identity is in a form suitable for analyzing the historical contributions of inter-fuel 
switching, energy conservation, economic growth, and population expansion to CO2 emissions by 
examining the relevant time-series data. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of this analysis for the period 1980-1997, based on data given in Table 3. It 
quantifies the historical contribution to CO2 emissions each factor has made. Population data, GDP values 
and commercial energy consumption of various types have been taken from the State Statistical Bureau 
(1992, 1998). The corresponding CO2 emissions associated with the fossil fuel consumption have been 
calculated above. Part of the data in Table 3 are presented in Figure 3, after normalization to the year 1980. 
 
The results in Table 4 and Figure 3 clearly indicate the relative importance of each factor in terms of its 
contribution to CO2 emissions growth. Given that China has been the most rapidly expanding economy 
over the past 17 years, it is not surprising that economic growth measured in per capita GDP was 
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overwhelming. This factor alone resulted in an increase of 799.13 MtC. During the corresponding period, 
through its strict family planning programmes, China experienced a very low rate of population growth in 
comparison with other countries at China’s income level, which in turn contributed to a smaller increase in 
China’s CO2 emissions than would otherwise have been the case.3 As a result, population expansion was 
responsible for an increase of 128.39 MtC, an increase in emissions considered to be modest given its 
population size. Also, the change in fossil fuel mix contributed to an increase in emissions (3.93 MtC), but 
its role was very limited because the share of coal use in total commercial energy consumption increased 
only slightly during the period. 
 
 
Table 4 
Breakdown of the Contributions to CO2 Emissions Growth, 1980-1997 (MtC)a 
 
Due to change 
in fossil fuel 
carbon 
intensity 
Due to 
penetration of 
carbon free 
fuel 
Due to change in 
energy intensity 
Due to 
economic 
growth 
Due to 
population 
expansion 
Total change in 
CO2 emissions 
+3.93 -10.48 -432.32 +799.13 +128.39 +488.65 
 
a A positive sign indicates an increase; A negative sign indicates a decline. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
By contrast, a reduction in energy intensity tended to push CO2 emissions down. Since the early 1980s, the 
Chinese government has been placing great emphasis on energy conservation and has formulated and 
implemented approximately 30 energy conservation laws concerning the administrative, legislative, 
economic and technological aspects of energy conservation. After years of preparation, China’s Energy 
Conservation Law was enacted on 1 November 1997 and came into force on 1 January 1998. In order to 
efficiently use energy, China has significantly reduced subsidies for energy consumption, with coal subsidy 
rates falling from 61% in 1984 to 37% in 1990 and to 29% in 1995, and petroleum subsidy rates falling 
from 55% in 1990 to 2% in 1995 (Kosmo, 1987; World Bank, 1997a). Currently, coal prices are largely 
decided by the market and vary significantly depending on the destination of the coal.4 Along with the 
economic reforms that, among other achievements, have spurred investment in more energy efficient 
production technologies, the Chinese government has also played a crucial role both in promoting a shift of 
economic structure towards less energy-intensive services (see Table 5) and a shift of product mix towards 
high value-added products, and in encouraging imports of energy-intensive products.5 Furthermore, efforts 
have been made towards implementing nationwide energy conservation programmes as exemplified by 
developing large-size coal-fired power plants. In 1987, only 11 power stations had an unit capacity of 1 
gigawatt (GW) and above. The combined capacity of these power stations was about 15 GW, accounting 
for one-seventh of the nation’s total. By 1994, there were 34 power stations having an unit capacity of 1 
GW and above, with a combined capacity of 43 GW, accounting for 21.4% of the nation’s total (SETC, 
1996). In the meantime, the share of generating units having a capacity of 100 MW and above increased 
from 32.5% in 1984 to 57.2% in 1994 (MOEP, 1985; SETC, 1996). Along with these large units 
commissioned into operation, the average generation efficiency of thermal power increased from 28.5% in 
1984 to 29.7% in 1994. 
                                                          
3 During the period 1980-1997, the annual average growth rate of population in China was 1.33%. In 
contrast, the corresponding figure for low-income economies (excluding China) between 1980 and 1995 
was 2.35%, and the world average was 1.66% (World Bank, 1997c). 
4 For example, the mine-mouth price of Datong mixed coal was 128 yuan per ton in June 1994. The same 
coal retained for 230 yuan per ton in Shanghai, 262 yuan per ton in Nanjing, 280 yuan per ton in 
Guangzhou, and 340 yuan per ton in Xiamen (SETC, 1996). 
5 About 10% of the total energy savings during the period 1981-1988 were attributed to imports of energy-
intensive products (Zhang, 1997a). 
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Table 5 
The Composition of GDP in China, Japan and the US (percentage of GDP) 
 
 China Japan United States 
 1980 1990 1997 1995 1995 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
30.1 
48.5 
21.4 
27.1 
41.6 
31.3 
18.7 
49.2 
32.1 
2 
38 
60 
2 
26 
72 
 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau (1998); World Bank (1997c). 
 
Time constraints and lack of the data do not allow for quantification of the magnitude of the effect of each 
policy and measure on reduced energy intensity measured by total energy consumption per unit of GDP. 
Clearly, however, it is by implementing these policies and measures that great progress in decoupling 
China’s GDP growth from energy consumption has been made, with an annual growth of 10.06% for the 
former but only 5.26% for the latter during the period 1980-1997. This achievement corresponds to an 
income elasticity of energy consumption of 0.52 and to an annual saving rate of 4.37%.6 Given the fact 
that most developing countries at China’s income level have the income elasticity of energy consumption 
well above one (see Table 6), this makes China’s achievement unique in the developing world.7 As a 
result, a reduction of 432.32 MtC was achieved. In other words, without the above policies and measures 
towards energy conservation, China’s CO2 emissions in 1997 would have been 432.32 MtC higher, or 
more than 50% higher, than its actual emissions. 
 
 
Table 6 
Growth Rates of GDP and Energy Consumption, and the Income Elasticity of Energy Consumption 
among Different Economies, 1980-1994 
 
 Annual growth 
of GDP (%) 
Annual growth of 
energy consumption (%) 
Income elasticity of 
energy consumption 
Low-income economies * 
    China 
Upper-middle-income economies 
High-income economies 
2.8 
11.0 
2.5 
2.8 
4.7 
4.5 
3.9 
1.1 
1.66 
0.41 
1.56 
0.39 
 
* Excluding China. 
Source: Calculated based on data from the World Bank (1996). 
In addition to energy conservation, the penetration of carbon-free fuels contributed to a small reduction in 
CO2 emissions (-10.48 MtC). This is mainly due to the underdevelopment of hydropower, and partly 
because the development of nuclear power in China is still at the initial start-up stage. 
 
                                                          
6 The income elasticity of energy consumption is defined as the change in energy consumption divided by 
the change in economic growth. 
7 As shown in Table 6, the income elasticity of energy consumption in China is quite low by international 
standards. In addition to energy conservation, there are other two possible explanations for this. First, the 
growth of energy consumption is underestimated relative to the GDP growth. Second, quantitative 
restrictions have kept energy consumption from rising as would otherwise have occurred. Drawing on the 
analysis of rationing by Neary and Roberts (1980), the quantitative restrictions act like an implicit energy 
tax levied at rates varying with use and fuel. Generally speaking, households face a higher implicit tax than 
industrial users, and oil and natural gas are taxed at a higher rate than coal.  
 9
From the preceding analysis, it follows that China has made significant contribution to reducing global 
CO2 emissions, although none of these carbon savings have resulted from domestic climate mitigation 
policies. While China is making such an impressive achievement, we might ask how the OECD countries 
perform in this regard. They accounted for 50.3% of global CO2 emissions in 1996 compared with 49.6% 
in 1990 (Jefferson, 1997) and promised at the Earth Summit in June 1992 to individually or jointly stablilize 
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases at their 1990 levels by 2000. As shown in Table 7, the total 
CO2 emissions in the OECD countries rose by 7.8% between 1990 and 1996. On their current trends, CO2 
emissions in the US and EU-15 (the fifteen member countries of the European Union) would be 13% and 
8% above the promised targets in 2000 respectively (Jefferson, 1997; Reid and Goldemberg, 1997). 
Therefore, it is fair to say that, with few exceptions, most of the OECD countries are unlikely to meet their 
voluntary commitments to stablilizing CO2 emissions at their 1990 levels by 2000. 
 
 
Table 7 
Changes in CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel among Selected Countries and Regions (%)a 
 
 1990-1996 1995-1996 
OECDb 
EU-15 
   Denmark 
   Germany 
   Netherlands 
   United Kingdom 
United States 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Norway 
CIS and C& E Europe 
Developing countries 
World 
+7.8 
+0.9 
+41.0 
-7.8 
+10.0 
-1.0 
+8.4 
+5.5 
+14.3 
+9.5 
+10.7 
+14.5 
-31.0 
+32.0 
+6.4 
+2.6 
+2.3 
+20.6 
+2.1 
+2.6 
+2.9 
+3.3 
+1.6 
+1.8 
+2.2 
+4.0 
+7.3 
-2.6 
+5.1 
+2.7 
 
a A positive sign indicates an increase; A negative sign indicates a decline. 
b Excluding Mexico, Korea, Hungary and Poland. 
Source: Jefferson (1997). 
 
3. Economic Effects of Future Carbon Limits for China 
 
While the US, the world’s largest CO2 emitter, will largely fail to honour its promise at the Earth Summit, 
it insists that controlling CO2 emissions requires substantial efforts in China. The US argues that no specific 
commitments from China will hamper the US economy to the benefit of China, with which the US has already 
run the huge trade deficit, and that China whose contribution to global CO2 emissions is already high will soon 
surpass the US as the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG). However, the Chinese authorities 
have claimed that China cannot be expected to make a significant contribution to solving the carbon emission 
problem, by arguing that ignoring the industrialized countries' responsibility for the majority of global CO2 
emissions and simply asking for special action on China's part would seriously harm China's economic devel-
opment and improvement of living standards. This contrasts sharply with the US demand. This section is 
devoted to explaining this difference in opinion, by analyzing the economic effects of possible future carbon 
limits for China. 
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To this end, a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Chinese economy has been 
developed.8 Using this CGE model, a baseline scenario for the Chinese economy has been developed under 
a set of assumptions about the exogenous variables. The baseline scenario is characterized by a rapid 
economic growth, with gross national product (GNP) being expected to grow at an average annual rate of 
7.95% for the period from 1990 to 2010. Although the calculated rates of GNP growth are lower than those 
achieved in the early 1980s and 1990s, they are well in line with the government targets of GNP growth 
rate, which are set at 8-9% per annum for the period 1990-2000 and at 7.2% thereafter to 2010.9 Rapid 
economic growth will lead to increased energy consumption and hence CO2 emissions, despite substantial 
energy efficiency improvement. As shown in Table 8, total energy consumption is expected to rise from 
987.0 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 1990 to 2560.4 million tce in 2010. Consequently, the 
baseline CO2 emissions are expected to grow from 586.9 million tons of carbon (tC) in 1990 to 1441.3 
million tC in 2010, at an average annual rate of 4.59% for the period to 2010. While the absolute amounts 
of CO2 emissions in China are increasing in line with its rapid economic development, its carbon emissions 
per unit of output are expected to be cut about in half during the period 1990-2010. 
 
 
Table 8 
Energy-Related Results for the Baseline Scenario of the Chinese Economy 
 
             1990 1997 2010 
Energy consumption (million tce) 
     Coal's share in total energy consumption (%) 
Energy consumption per capita (tce) 
CO2 emissions (million tons of carbon) 
Carbon intensity of GDP (GNP)a 
CO2 emissions per capita (tons of carbon) 
987.0 
76.2 
0.86 
586.9 
0.802 
0.51 
1440.0 
73.5 
1.16 
847.3 
0.551 
0.69 
2560.4 
67.5 
1.80 
1441.3 
0.427 
1.01 
 
a Measured in tC per thousand US$ at 1980 prices. 
Sources: Zhang (1997a, 1998a). Own calculations. 
 
On a per capita basis, China's energy consumption of 0.86 tce in 1990 is expected to rise to 1.80 tce in 
2010, while the corresponding CO2 emissions of 0.51 tC in 1990 are expected to rise to 1.01 tC in 2010. 
Although the amounts are expected to double over twenty years, they are still well below the 
corresponding current world average levels, which were equal to 2.12 tce and 1.14 tC respectively in 1990 
(Zhang, 1997a). 
 
Using the CGE model, we have then analyzed the implications of two scenarios under which China's CO2 
emissions in 2010 will be cut by 20% and 30% respectively relative to the baseline (see Figure 4). The two 
emission targets are less restrictive in that they are not compared with the level of emissions in a single base 
year, but with the baseline CO2 emissions in 2010, the latter being 2.46 times that in 1990. The carbon tax 
required to achieve a 20% cut in CO2 emissions in 2010 relative to the baseline is estimated to be US$ 18 at 
1987 prices, while the corresponding figure necessary to achieve a 30% cut in CO2 emissions in 2010 is 
estimated to be US$ 35 at 1987 prices.10 This means that a larger absolute cut in CO2 emissions will require a 
                                                          
8 Zhang (1997a) and Zhang and Folmer (1998) have argued that in analyzing the economic impacts of limiting 
CO2 emissions, a CGE approach is generally considered an appropriate tool. For a detailed description of the 
CGE model for China and its application, see Zhang (1997a, 1998a, 1998b). 
9 Converted to the period 1990-2010, the government target of GNP growth rate ranges from 7.6% to 8.1% 
per annum. 
10 Although a carbon tax is incorporated as a means in this modeling exercise, it is not first order in 
considering China’s response strategies for climate change. The main concern is whether China can afford or 
were determined to commit to an emissions cap. If there were an emissions cap for China, using a carbon tax 
would be not impossible, given that a carbon tax is a cost-effective means of limiting carbon emissions and 
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higher carbon tax. A higher tax also implies higher fuel-specific tax rates and hence higher prices of fossil 
fuels. 
 
 
Figure 4 
CO2 Emissions in China under Alternative Scenarios 
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As shown in Table 9, even under the two less restrictive carbon emission scenarios, China's GNP drops by 
1.5% and 2.8% respectively and its welfare measured in Hicksian equivalent variation11 drops by 1.1% and 
1.8% respectively in 2010 relative to the baseline. This indicates that the associated GNP and welfare losses 
tend to rise more sharply as the degree of the emission reduction increases. Given the fact that most studies 
surveyed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change second assessment report estimate that the 
economic losses under very restrictive carbon limits (e.g. stabilization or even 20% below 1990 levels in 
2010) are reported not to exceed 2% of GNP for the OECD countries (IPCC, 1996), our results also support 
the general finding from global studies that China would be one of the regions hardest hit by carbon limits.12 
This, combined with the industrialized countries being responsible for the majority of global CO2 emissions, 
explains the Chinese government stance on carbon abatement. 
 
 
Table 9 
Main Macroeconomic Effects for China in 2010 
(Percentage deviations relative to the baseline)a 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that China has used emissions charges to control emissions of a number of pollutants, including SO2 
emissions in the acid rain control area. 
11 Equivalent variation (EV) takes the pre-policy equilibrium income and consumer prices as given and 
measures the maximum amount of income that a consumer would be willing to pay to avoid the price 
change. Because EV measures income change at pre-policy prices, this makes it more suitable for 
comparisons among a variety of policy changes compared with the compensating variation. At each point 
in time, if EV is positive, post-policy welfare is improving; if negative, post-policy welfare is worsening. 
12 There are many ways in measuring the fairness of sacrifice. Here we interpret the results according to the 
equal sacrifice criterion that cost incurred as a fraction of GNP should be equal for each country. 
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GNP 
Welfare 
Private consumption 
Investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Energy consumption 
CO2 emissions 
Price elasticity of carbon abatement 
 
Price of coal 
Price of oil 
Price of natural gas 
Average price of fossil fuels 
Price of electricity 
Terms-of-trade 
Nominal wage rate 
Real exchange rate 
User price of capital 
Prices of exports 
Prices of imports 
-1.521 
-1.078 
-1.165 
-0.686 
-5.382 
-1.159 
-19.468 
-20.135 
-0.396 
 
+64.954 
+15.296 
+46.813 
+50.888 
+22.785 
+3.636 
-1.807 
-0.004 
-1.777 
+3.633 
-0.004 
-2.763 
-1.753 
-2.972 
-1.832 
-7.447 
-2.128 
-29.322 
-30.112 
-0.317 
 
+123.095 
+29.144 
+90.564 
+94.895 
+43.256 
+3.822 
-3.043 
-0.021 
-4.228 
+3.801 
-0.021 
 
a A positive sign indicates an increase; A negative sign indicates a decline. 
Sources: Zhang (1997a, 1998a). 
 
Table 10 shows the carbon tax levels across the countries and regions considered. It can be seen that there are 
significant differences in the carbon taxes required in order to achieve the same percentage of emission 
reductions relative to the baseline. As shown in Table 10, the carbon taxes would be much higher in the 
industrialized countries than in the developing countries, because the industrialized countries already have 
relatively energy-efficient economies, have limited possibilities for substituting less polluting energy sources, 
and already have high pre-carbon tax energy prices as a result of existing energy taxes. Moreover, Table 10 
clearly indicates that the carbon taxes required in China in order to achieve the same percentage of emission 
reductions relative to the baseline are much lower than those of the industrialized countries and the world 
average. This provides the economic rationale for the development of carbon credit investment projects in 
China. Through the so-called “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, developing 
countries will be encouraged to combat global climate change. Now the US even wants to go beyond this by 
demanding major developing countries like China to commit themselves to some kind of limitation on GHG 
emissions, and threats that its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is conditional on this. How should China 
respond to this challenge? This leads to another large subject. 
 
 
 
Table 10  
Carbon Taxes across Regions in 2010 
(at 1985 $ per ton of carbon) 
 
 USA Japan EEC Total OECD China World 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
53.4 
120.3 
55.9 
103.1 
85.7 
158.6 
62.7 
132.3 
10.1 
18.3 
45.1 
92.9 
 
Sources: Zhang (1997a, 1998a). 
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4. Beyond Kyoto: Should China’s Current Stance Remain Unchanged? 
In the run up to Kyoto, many Parties to the UNFCCC were keen to see joint implementation (JI) as a key part 
of any protocol -- even although it is not without conceptual and operational problems (Zhang, 1997a, 1997b). 
For example, the US had incorporated JI in its Draft Protocol to the UNFCCC submitted on 17 January 1997 
to its Secretariat. Although it is regarded as offering the potential for lowering the global costs of abating 
GHG emissions, from the beginning, China, joining in many other developing countries, has strongly opposed 
to the concept of JI. With the support of many Western environmental non-governmental organisations, the 
developing countries have accused the developed countries of using JI as a means of buying their way out of 
responsibility for climate problems while postponing radical changes in their own consumption patterns and 
passing the responsibility on to the developing countries. The fact that JI is voluntary and is based on the 
decision of both Parties will probably not have much effect on their view. Developing countries have also 
expressed the fear that: 
 
• All their low-cost abatement options would be used up, leaving them to face only high-cost options if 
they would be subsequently required to reduce their own emissions. 
• The OECD countries would redefine existing development aid projects as JI projects, and reduce their aid 
budgets accordingly. Small developing countries, in particular, fear that JI would tend to shift the OECD 
countries' attention towards those developing countries with large economies and GHG emissions. 
• Developed countries may use JI to interfere their internal affairs, given that the implementation of JI 
projects across national borders would touch on the issue of national sovereignty. 
 
Acknowledging the strong opposition to JI in the developing world, the first Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the UNFCCC in Berlin in April 1995 endorsed a pilot phase of JI referred to as “Activities Implemented 
Jointly” (AIJ) among Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties. During the AIJ 
pilot phase, which ends no later than the year 2000, emission reductions achieved are not allowed to be 
credited to current national commitments of investor countries under the UNFCCC. Since inception of the 
pilot phase, however, a relatively small number of AIJ projects have so far been officially reported to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat as being accepted, approved or endorsed by the governments of the host and investor 
countries. This is attributed to a lack of adequate incentives for the private sector participation in project 
financing. In addition, the geographical distribution of these projects is quite uneven, with very few AIJ 
projects being established in Africa and Asia. 
 
To speed up the cooperation between Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries in combating climate 
change, at the third COP held in Kyoto in December 1997, the CDM was established. Through the 
mechanism, Annex I countries can obtain the “certified emission reductions” (CERs) from jointly 
implemented projects with non-Annex I countries, and use them to count towards meeting their 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM differs from the AIJ in several aspects. The CDM 
explicitly aims to help non-Annex I countries achieve sustainable development, is a multilateral and trading 
mechanism, allows trading, and incorporates adaptation. It seems that the group of 77 and China may prove 
somewhat more receptive to the CDM than to the original concept of JI. But many issues remain 
unresolved, in particular regarding how the CDM will function, and what kind of modalities and rules will 
be applied for CDM projects. These issues, together with securing a meaningful participation of developing 
countries, will be on the top agenda at the fourth COP to be held in Buenos Aires in November 1998. 
 
4.1 The Changed Negotiating Environment   
Prior to Kyoto, developing counties’ demand for the US to demonstrate the leadership and the EU proposal for 
a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective 
pressure on the US, which leads the world in GHG emissions. Now the US has made legally binding 
commitments at Kyoto. The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the US 
economy would not be disrupted unreasonably (King, 1998).13 Now the ball is kicked off to China’s court. 
                                                          
13 As indicated in Table 7, the US CO2 emissions in 1996 were already 8.4% above 1990 levels. To meet the 
Kyoto commitments requires the US to cut its GHG emissions by up to 30% from its business-as-usual levels 
during the period 2008-2012. This is not tremendous but not trivial either. 
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The US has made it clear that bringing key developing countries, including China, on board will be the 
focus of the upcoming fourth COP in Buenos Aires. According to some US Senators, it will be countries 
like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the US will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore 
conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make some kind of commitments at and beyond 
Buenos Aires. The world’s media will undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which will 
be seen as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the US Senate and possibly even be blamed for 
“blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries’ commitments. 
 
While preparing for greater and greater pressure from the US, China should take the following non-US 
factors into account in developing its post-Kyoto climate negotiation strategies.   
 
First, moving the meeting place of the COP from industrialized countries to a developing country presents 
an unprecedented challenge for China. For the first time, the COP’s annual conference will take place in a 
developing country, and the host country, Argentina, certainly hopes that the spirit of Kyoto would 
continue so that Buenos Aires, too, would  be regarded positively. If the success of the third COP at Kyoto 
was marked by the setting of legally binding emissions targets and timetables for industrialized countries and 
by incorporating cooperative implementation mechanisms, then the fate of the fourth COP at Buenos Aires 
will hinge on how and to what extent developing countries should be brought into the battle against climate 
change, and whether rules and guidelines could be worked out for cooperative implementation mechanisms. 
As might be expected, Argentina has proposed placing the voluntary reduction in GHG emissions by 
developing countries on the agenda. 
 
Second, although the group of 77 and China14 managed to block the US proposal for allowing a 
developing country to voluntarily commit to reductions in GHG emissions at Kyoto, the US had partial 
success in weakening the position of the group. As might be expected, the US will probably continue to 
apply the “divide and rule” tactic by getting at least a few to accept obligations they are not required to 
undertake and then putting pressure on the rest of the developing countries to do the same, exploiting the fact 
that such developing countries as South Korea and Argentina have already prepared to take on voluntary 
commitments.15 Given the fact that developing countries are a more diverse and heterogeneous group than the 
Annex I countries, and that their interests in the climate change debate are heterogeneous and occasionally 
competing, it might be very difficult to prevent some countries in the group -- particularly those countries 
with a relatively high per capita income and that perceive the greatest potential gain from emissions trading 
-- from being drawn into making commitments of their own at and beyond Buenos Aires. 
 
Third, after the first commitment period 2008-2012, China will soon surpass the US as the world’s largest 
GHG emitter, due mainly to its sheer size of population and partly to its rapidly growing economy. While it 
will still take another couple of decades for cumulative GHG emissions from China to exceed those of the 
US, Western media and some US Senators could deliberately misguide the general public’s attention and then 
shift the attack on the US to China. 
 
Under these new circumstances, it would be unwise for China just to sit back and let the US define what is 
“meaningful participation” from developing countries. It would be also unwise for China simply to reject 
any proposals at and beyond Buenos Aires. Doing so would only create negative image and publicity for 
China, which has been regarded as a “hard liner” at the climate change negotiations. In the meantime, 
China should keep watch on the negotiating positions of such developing countries as Argentina, Costa 
                                                          
14 As has been the case in the international climate change negotiations, the developing countries express 
their consensus views as the group of 77 and China’s positions. Divergent or dissenting views are then 
expressed separately, representing either individual countries or smaller groups, such as the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). 
15 South Korean is recently reported to have prepared to take part in reducing GHG emissions from 2018 
(Dow Jones Newswires, 15 July 1998). With this, South Korea earns the distinction of being the first 
developing economy as designed under the Kyoto Protocol to express its intent to reduce GHG emissions. 
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Rica and South Korean and should not let the fate of the whole South be left at the hands of these relatively 
high-per-capita-income countries. 
 
4.2 Strategies for China’s post-Kyoto Climate Change Negotiations 
Faced with a different situation from that at Kyoto, China should ponder deeply over its strategies at the 
post-Kyoto climate change negotiations. On the one hand, China should take much more efforts towards 
communicating to the industrialized world the substantial contributions it has already made to limiting 
GHG emissions. China has cut its energy consumption per unit of output in half since 1980, indicating that 
if the energy intensity were the same now as that in 1980, China would consume twice as much energy, 
and produce twice as much CO2 emissions as it now does. Unfortunately, this achievement is not widely 
known or appreciated outside of China: outsiders know that the Chinese economy is booming, but they are not 
as cognizant of China’s very impressive improvement in energy efficiency. Therefore, efforts towards 
effective communication about what has been achieved in China to the outside world will help to correct the 
distorted picture that had been painted. 
 
On the other hand, while insisting on its legitimate demand for industrialized countries to provide adequate 
technology transfer and financing, and demanding that emissions targets beyond the first commitment period 
be set for Annex I countries at the subsequent negotiations over new additional developing countries’ 
commitments, China could propose and direct negotiations, rather than just react and respond. In proposing its 
voluntary efforts and commitments, China should bear in mind that demanding for the “equal per capita 
entitlements” is politically unrealistic for the time span we are considering, although it is perfectly justified on 
grounds that all human beings are born equal and that the atmosphere is a global common. On the other hand, 
the US demand for imposing a cap on China’s future emissions is absolutely unacceptable for China, at least 
until its per capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries. For these reasons, we 
reject both “equal per capita entitlements” and an absolute cap on national emissions. We envision the 
following five proposals that could be put on the table as China’s plausible negotiation position, which are 
each described in the order of their stringentness. 
 
First, just as Article 3.2 requires Annex I countries to “have made demonstrable progress” in achieving 
their commitments by 2005, China could commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its GHG 
emissions growth at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Securing the undefined 
“demonstrable progress” regarding China’s efforts is the best option that China should fight for at and 
beyond the fourth COP in Buenos Aires. 
 
Second, if the above commitment is not considered “meaningful”, China could go a little farther to make 
voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit GHG emissions at some point between 
the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and measures might need to be developed to explicitly 
demonstrate whether or not China has made adequate efforts. Such policies and measures might include 
abolishing energy subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energies, and 
increasing the R&D spending on developing environmentally sound coal technologies. 
 
China should resort to all means of securing either of the above deals. It could even lobby for support from the 
EU, and therefore put collective pressure on the US.16 If all the attempts prove unsuccessful, China might 
resort to the last three options. 
                                                          
16 In the run up to Kyoto, the following two points distinguish the EU from the US. In comparison with the 
US demand for developing countries to agree to cuts in GHG emissions in the same timeframe as 
industrialized countries, the EU has made clear that developing countries need not to promise at Kyoto to 
make cuts, although they should be persuaded to do so at a later date. Moreover, by permitting a 30-40% 
increase in emissions to Greece and Portugal, the EU proposal for international community burden-sharing 
accepts that poorer countries should be treated more leniently, whereas the US has been opposed to 
differentiated emissions targets until it has to give up its opposition at Kyoto. If Greece and Portugal can 
have this sort of rise, it would be very difficult for the EU to reject the demand from the really poor, that is, 
developing countries, for a not unreasonable leeway in emissions. 
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Third, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total GHG emissions per 
unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020.17 Such a commitment would still allow China to grow 
economically while improving the environment. It reflects a basic element of the UNFCCC, which has 
recongnized the developing countries’ need for further development and economic growth. The 
industrialized countries, particularly the US, have no reason or right to argue against it. To do so would 
contradict their claim that asking China’s involvement in combating global climate change is not intended 
to limit its capacity to industrialize, reduce poverty and raise its standards of living. Even if the Chinese 
government has claimed that China will continue its efforts towards improving energy efficiency and 
minimizing further degradation of the environment in any event, it would be wise to propose an explicit value 
for energy or carbon intensity of the economy as a starting point for negotiations. In this regard, there is a 
pressing need for comprehensive analysis and quantification of the economic implications of climate change 
for China. For a long time, the Chinese government has claimed that asking for China to take actions would 
seriously harm China’s economic development. However, until now, there has been no single comprehensive 
study indicating the economic effects of possible future carbon limits for China, for example, in terms of 
foregone national income. Findings that show that China would be the region hardest hit by carbon limits can 
help convince the world of the Chinese government’s claim. Such information can be used to China’s 
advantage in bargaining a possible targeted energy or carbon intensity with other countries, as well. 
 
The fourth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a particular sector at 
some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, although already burdensome for 
China, could raise the US concern about the carbon leakage from the sector to those sectors whose 
emissions are not capped. 
 
This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted energy or carbon intensity 
level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. This is the bottom 
line: China can not afford to go beyond it until its per capita income catches up with the level of middle-
developed countries. 
 
4.3 Combating Global Climate Change Is in China’s Interest 
Because economic development remains the priority for China, its climate policy would focus on the so-
called win-win strategies. The above efforts and commitments proposed for China reflect that; they do not 
go beyond the scope of taking no-cost or low-cost “no-regrets” actions. Although the last three 
commitments are more stringent than the first two, none of them would be likely to severely jeopardize 
Chinese economic development. Indeed, taking due responsibilities in combating global climate change 
should be in China’s interest on the following grounds. 
 
First, because climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture still account for a much larger proportion of GDP in 
China than in the developed countries (see Table 5), China is even more vulnerable to climate change than the 
developed countries. Therefore, a broad commitment to global efforts towards limiting GHG emissions would 
reduce the potential damage from climate change in China itself, since after all it is not only the developed 
countries whose climate will change if GHG emissions are not reduced. 
 
Second, China is scarce in energy, with per capita energy endowments far below the world average (see Table 
11). Although energy consumption per unit of output in China has been cut in half since 1980, its major 
industries continue to use energy far more intensively than in industrialized countries (see Table 12). By 
making the above commitments, China will be pushed for a more efficient use of its scarce energy resources. 
 
 
Table 11 
Proved Reserves and Utilization Rates of Fossil Fuels in China, 1997 
                                                          
17 Carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy because all the efforts 
towards shifting away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former. 
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Resources Proved reserves R/P ratioa (years) Per capita proved reservesb 
 China China World China World 
Coal 
   % world total 
Oil 
   % world total 
Natural gas 
   % world total 
114.5 billion tons 
11.1% 
3.3 billion tons 
2.3% 
1.16 trillion cubic meters 
0.8% 
82 
 
21 
 
52 
219 
 
41 
 
64 
95 
 
3 
 
967 
182 
 
25 
 
25517 
 
a R/P ratio stands for the lifetime of proved reserves at 1997 rates of production. 
b Measured in tons for coal and oil and in cubic meters for natural gas and based on population in 1995. 
Sources: Calculated based on data from the British Petroleum (1998) and World Bank (1997c). 
 
 
Table 12  
A Comparison of Unit Energy Consumption for Selected Energy-Intensive Users 
 
 1980 
China 
1994 
China 
Advanced level 
abroad 
Comparable energy consumption per ton of steel (tce/t) 
Energy consumption per ton of synthetic ammonia (tce/t) 
      Large plants 
      Small plants 
Energy consumption per ton of cement clinker (kgce/t) 
Net coal consumption of coal-fired plants (gce/kWh) 
Thermal efficiency of industrial boilers (%) 
1.30 
 
1.45 
2.90 
206.5 
448 
1.03a 
 
1.34a 
2.09 
175.3 
413 
60-70 
0.6 (Italy) 
1.2 
 
 
108.4 (Japan) 
327 (ex-USSR) 
80-85 
 
a In 1990. 
Source: Zhang (1997a). 
 
Third, driven by the threat of further degradation of the environment18 and the harmful economic effects of 
energy shortages, China is already determined to push energy conservation and enhanced energy efficiency in 
general and more efficient coal usage in particular. Although it is taking such drastic domestic efforts on its 
own, China badly needs assistance and economic and technical cooperation with the developed countries, 
because of the huge amounts of capital and technical expertise required. In this regard, the CDM, if designed 
appropriately, could provide an opportunity for China to get increased access to more advanced energy 
efficiency and pollution control technologies and additional funding. 
 
From this, it follows that the above efforts and commitments proposed for China, though aimed at limiting 
GHG emissions, will contribute to the reductions in local pollutants and thus will be beneficial to a more 
sustainable development of the Chinese economy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the face of a potentially serious global climate change problem, the industrialized countries finally 
committed themselves to legally binding emissions targets and timetables for reducing their GHG emissions in 
                                                          
18 Existing estimates for the economic costs of China’s environmental degradation vary, depending on the 
comprehensiveness of the estimates. For example, using the measure of willingness to pay, the World Bank 
(1997b) has estimated that air and water pollution cost China about 8% of its GDP, around $54 billion 
annually, while Smil (1996) puts China’s environmental damages between 5.5% and 9.8% of its GNP. 
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Kyoto. Since China has made no concrete commitments, it has been criticised as a “free-rider”. By examining 
the historical evolution of China’s CO2 emissions during the period 1980-1997, however, and analyzing 
the historical contributions of inter-fuel switching, energy conservation, economic growth and population 
expansion to CO2 emissions, we have shown that such criticism is without foundation. Indeed, China has 
made significant contribution to reducing global CO2 emissions. By implementing a series of  policies and 
measures towards energy conservation, China has cut its energy consumption per unit of output in half 
since 1980. In other words, without these efforts, China’s CO2 emissions in 1997 would have been 432.32 
MtC higher, or more than 50% higher, than its actual emissions. Given the fact that most developing 
countries at China’s income level have the income elasticity of energy consumption well above one (see 
Table 6), this makes China’s achievement unique in the developing world, and surpasses that of the OECD 
countries, most of which will fail to honour their promises at the Earth Summit to stabilizing CO2 
emissions at their 1990 levels by 2000. Clearly, in order to correct a much distorted picture that had been 
painted for China, there is a pressing need for China to take more efforts to effectively communicate its 
achievements to the outside world. 
 
Of course, this is not to justify no further action by China. Indeed, faced with both the mounting pressure 
from the US and the new post-Kyoto negotiating environment, and given the global characteristics of climate 
change and China's importance as a source of future CO2 emissions in line with its industrialization and 
urbanization, China cannot come away without taking due responsibilities. On the other hand, it should be 
kept in mind that economic development still remains the priority for China. For this reason, any demand 
for imposing a cap on its future emissions is absolutely unacceptable for China, at least until its per capita 
income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries. Realistic efforts and commitments that could 
be expected from China range from demonstrating efforts towards slowing its GHG emissions growth at 
some point between the first commitment period and 2020 to committing to a combination of a targeted 
energy or carbon intensity level with an emissions cap on a particular sector around or beyond 2020. With 
their focus on the win-win strategies, such efforts and commitments could be unlikely to severely 
jeopardize the Chinese economic development and, at the same time, would give China more leverage at the 
post-Kyoto climate change negotiations. Though aimed at limiting GHG emissions, they will also contribute 
to the reductions in local pollutants and thus will be beneficial to a more sustainable development of the 
Chinese economy as well as to the global climate. 
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